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Medial Prefrontal Cortical Activity Reflects Dynamic Re-Evaluation
During Voluntary Persistence
Abstract

Deciding how long to keep waiting for future rewards is a nontrivial problem, especially when the timing of
rewards is uncertain. We carried out an experiment in which human decision makers waited for rewards in
two environments in which reward-timing statistics favored either a greater or lesser degree of behavioral
persistence. We found that decision makers adaptively calibrated their level of persistence for each
environment. Functional neuroimaging revealed signals that evolved differently during physically identical
delays in the two environments, consistent with a dynamic and context-sensitive reappraisal of subjective
value. This effect was observed in a region of ventromedial prefrontal cortex that is sensitive to subjective value
in other contexts, demonstrating continuity between valuation mechanisms involved in discrete choice and in
temporally extended decisions analogous to foraging. Our findings support a model in which voluntary
persistence emerges from dynamic cost/benefit evaluation rather than from a control process that overrides
valuation mechanisms.
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Abstract
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Deciding how long to keep waiting for future rewards is a nontrivial problem, especially when the
timing of rewards is uncertain. We report an experiment in which human decision makers waited
for rewards in two environments, in which reward-timing statistics favored either a greater or
lesser degree of behavioral persistence. We found that decision makers adaptively calibrated their
level of persistence for each environment. Functional neuroimaging revealed signals that evolved
differently during physically identical delays in the two environments, consistent with a dynamic
and context-sensitive reappraisal of subjective value. This effect was observed in a region of
ventromedial prefrontal cortex that is sensitive to subjective value in other contexts, demonstrating
continuity between valuation mechanisms involved in discrete choice and in temporally extended
decisions analogous to foraging. Our findings support a model in which voluntary persistence
emerges from dynamic cost/benefit evaluation rather than from a control process that overrides
valuation mechanisms.
Pursuing long-run rewards often requires persistence in the face of delay and short-run costs.
The capacity to delay gratification is central to the notion of self-control in human decision
making, and failures of persistence can appear to reflect impulsivity, inconsistency, or selfcontrol failure1, 2. Here we used fMRI to examine brain activity associated with sustaining
or curtailing persistence toward delayed rewards.

Author Manuscript

Much is known about neural systems involved in value-based decision making3–6, but it is
unknown what role these mechanisms play in temporally extended persistence. Most
intertemporal choice research focuses on discrete choices among outcomes that differ in
delay7–9. Delay-of-gratification scenarios, in contrast, involve a prolonged delay period with
a continuously available opportunity to give up1. These two types of future-oriented
behavior are widely thought to involve different mental processes. Mischel and colleagues10
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have argued that the initial selection of a delayed reward depends on a rational cost/benefit
assessment, but that the subsequent ability to wait for it depends on self-regulatory dynamics
(competition between hot and cool motivational systems11).

Author Manuscript

We previously hypothesized that both successes and apparent failures of persistence emerge
from dynamic value maximization12, 13. Because the exact timing of future events is usually
uncertain, there is no guarantee that a decision maker who was willing to begin waiting for a
delayed reward should necessarily be willing to keep waiting indefinitely. In some
situations, including many that seem to challenge self-control, a long delay so far is
predictive of a longer-than-expected delay yet to come12–15. One way to navigate such
situations would be to reassess the subjective value of the awaited reward as time passes,
based on a continuously updated estimate of the remaining delay time12. Such a
reassessment might be encoded in the same neural valuation system, comprised of
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), ventral striatum (VS) and posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), that encodes subjective value in a highly general manner across many other
kinds of decisions3–6. The subjective value representations encoded in VMPFC are known
to be sensitive to both immediate and delayed outcomes7, 8, primary and secondary forms of
reward3, 16, goal-related and temptation-related factors9, 17, and high-level task
contingencies18, 19.

Author Manuscript

Other theoretical perspectives make different predictions. One alternative possibility is that
successful persistence depends principally on cognitive control mechanisms external to the
valuation system. Although some accounts hold that the VMPFC valuation system mediates
cognitive control9, 17, 20, other accounts posit a form of control that overrides or competes
with valuation2, 11, 20–23. If the latter control mechanism is paramount, successful
persistence might be better understood as rule-adherence than as value-maximization, and
curtailing persistence might reflect a lapse in control-related brain activity (e.g., in lateral
PFC).
A second alternative possibility is based on the structural parallel between delay of
gratification and certain kinds of foraging scenarios13, 15, 24–27. It has recently been
hypothesized that single-alternative foraging decisions—e.g., whether to exploit one’s
current food patch or depart to forage elsewhere—might depend, not on the VMPFC
valuation system, but on a representation in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) of the
value of departing26, 28.

Author Manuscript

To examine valuation signals during temporally extended persistence we conducted an fMRI
experiment in which participants repeatedly decided how long to keep waiting for future
monetary rewards (Fig. 1a). On each trial the participant viewed a token, which had no
initial value but matured to a value of 30¢ after a random delay. The participant could sell
the token anytime and initiate a new trial, aiming to maximize total earnings in a fixed time
period. Unlike some previous studies1, 13, no small reward was delivered if the participant
quit early; instead, the main incentive to quit was the possibility that the next trial might
mature with a shorter delay.
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The ideal strategy depended on the distribution of delay times, which differed between two
environments (Fig. 1b,c). In a high-persistence (HP) environment the most productive
strategy was to wait for every reward (up to 40s). In a limited-persistence (LP) environment
the best strategy was to wait 20s and then quit if the reward had not arrived. Participants
learned about the timing statistics through direct experience during preliminary training. The
environments were presented in alternating 10-min runs, marked by different-colored
tokens.

Author Manuscript

We predicted that participants would quit earlier in the LP environment than in the HP
environment13. In addition, our theoretical model predicted that participants’ subjective
valuation of the awaited token would evolve differently in the two environments, increasing
more rapidly with elapsed time in the HP environment than the LP environment. Our
neuroimaging experiment tested whether canonically value-responsive brain regions would
reflect this dynamic reassessment. Our experiment could also detect alternative possibilities
such as representations of subjective value elsewhere in the brain, a lapse in control-related
activity associated with quitting, or a representation of the value of quitting in dACC.

Results
Behavioral results
Participants (n=20) quit before receiving the reward more often in the LP environment
(median=50.0% of trials; IQR 46.6 to 57.6%) than the HP environment (median=3.1%; IQR
0 to 15.6%). In the LP environment the time waited before quitting (median of medians) was
29.3s (IQR 17.6 to 36.6). Within-subject (across-trial) variability in quit timing was
comparatively small: the median size of the within-subject interquartile range was 9.1s.

Author Manuscript

Participants were willing to wait longer in the HP environment than the LP environment. We
used survival analysis to estimate each participant’s probability of “surviving” various
lengths of time without quitting13. Fig. 2a shows averaged subject-wise empirical survival
curves against ideal performance. The area under the curve (AUC) estimates how much of
the first 40s a participant was willing to wait on average (Fig. 2b). Median AUC was 38.9s
in the HP environment (IQR 35.4 to 40; ideal=40s) and 30.2s in the LP environment (IQR
22.3 to 34.9; ideal=20s). All 20 participants persisted longer in the HP environment (median
difference=7.6s, IQR 3.0 to 14.2, signed-rank p<0.001). Persistence in the two environments
was modestly correlated (Spearman ρn=20=0.37, p=0.11; Fig. 2b), and behavior was stable
across the fMRI experiment (Supplementary Fig. 1).

Author Manuscript

Reaction time (RT) to sell rewarded tokens tracked time-varying reward expectancy. When
an event’s latency is uniformly distributed, expectancy theoretically increases with elapsed
time28 (Fig. 2c). Accordingly, subject-wise Spearman correlations between delay and RT
were reliably negative in the HP environment (median single-subject ρ=−0.27, IQR −0.36 to
−0.16, signed-rank p<0.001), indicating faster responses to rewards that were preceded by
longer delays (Fig. 2d) and implying that participants successfully encoded the task’s timing
statistics.

Nat Neurosci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 November 01.

McGuire and Kable

Page 4

Theoretical modeling

Author Manuscript

The passage of time can drive a dynamic reassessment of awaited rewards by furnishing
information about the remaining delay12, 29. Intuitively, rewards in the HP environment
grew nearer and more subjectively valuable as time passed, but rewards in the LP
environment became progressively less likely to be delivered before the participant quit.

Author Manuscript

We formalized this intuition in a theoretical model of subjective valuation. The model
estimated the awaited token’s subjective value at each point in the delay interval, accounting
for the changing probability distribution over remaining delay durations. Our model
extended a formalism from the optimal foraging literature known as the potential function25.
The expected remaining delay was multiplied by the opportunity cost of time and subtracted
from the expected reward. Subjective value at a given elapsed time equaled the expected net
return in the remainder of the current trial, maximized over all possible giving-up times. Its
minimum was zero since the agent could always quit immediately. If subjective value
exceeded zero, this signified that the decision maker could do better by waiting than by
quitting immediately. The level of subjective value at each time reflected the margin of
preference for waiting over quitting (see Methods for details).
In the HP environment the token’s theoretical subjective value increased with elapsed time,
reflecting the progressive shortening of the expected remaining delay (Fig. 3a). In the LP
environment the token’s subjective value remained positive until 20s but then fell to zero,
reflecting that the best strategy was to quit if the reward had not arrived by then. Differences
between the subjective value trajectories in the two environments were primarily driven by
the evolving probability that the reward would arrive before the optimal giving-up time
(Supplementary Fig. 2).

Author Manuscript

We modeled the empirical behavioral data as a stochastic function of theoretical subjective
value using logistic regression (Fig. 3b; see Methods for details). Greater subjective value
was associated with higher odds of waiting (median coefficient=0.26, IQR 0.05 to 0.78,
signed-rank p<0.001). The subjective value model significantly outperformed an interceptonly model (subject-wise likelihood-ratio tests: median z=4.26, IQR 1.79 to 7.97, signedrank p<0.001) and an alternative model that directly fit different overall rates of quitting in
the HP and LP conditions (subject-wise difference of model deviances: median=6.45, IQR
−1.85 to 32.02, signed-rank p=0.033).
Neuroimaging results

Author Manuscript

Our fMRI analyses tested for brain signals that evolved differently during physically
identical delay intervals in the two environments. Trial-onset-locked BOLD timecourses
were flexibly estimated in each environment using a finite impulse response (FIR) model;
i.e., a series of single-timepoint basis functions in a general linear model (GLM). Each trial
was modeled from onset up to 1s before the outcome (reward cue or quit response). Because
trials had different durations, earlier timepoints were observed on more trials than later
timepoints (Supplementary Fig. 3). Group analyses focused on the interval from 2.5–30s, for
which 19 of 20 participants contributed complete data. Because the HP and LP conditions
were presented in separate scanning runs with independent baselines our analyses focused
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on differential change over time, not the overall offset between the two conditions.
Significance was assessed using whole-brain permutation tests to control for multiple
comparisons (see Methods).

Author Manuscript

A model-based fMRI contrast tested directly for effects of theoretical subjective value on
BOLD activity. For each subject and voxel, the empirical difference timecourse (HP minus
LP) was regressed on the predicted difference (Fig. 3c,d; see Methods) and a constant
intercept. The resulting contrast coefficient reflected the degree to which BOLD signal
increased more steeply with elapsed time in the HP environment than the LP environment.
Coefficients were submitted to a whole-brain, two-tailed, group-level test (n=20). This
identified a single significant cluster, located in VMPFC (Fig. 4a and Table 1a), in which
BOLD signal was positively related to theoretical subjective value. No negative effects of
subjective value on BOLD were identified, even in follow-up analyses tailored to detect
signals reflecting the difficulty of persistence (Supplementary Fig. 4).
The observed effect in VMPFC echoes effects of subjective value that are seen in a broad
range of other contexts3–6. We formally juxtaposed our results with previous findings by
quantifying the spatial overlap between our empirical results and canonically valuationrelated brain regions derived from a 206-study meta-analysis3 (Fig. 4a). The meta-analysis
had identified clusters showing preferentially positive effects of value in VMPFC (9.67cm3),
striatum (21.41cm3), and PCC (2.62cm3). There was a 100-voxel (2.70cm3) region of
overlap in VMPFC (27.9% of the canonical region and 32.2% of the empirical cluster).

Author Manuscript

As an alternative test of the same question, the three canonical valuation areas were tested as
regions of interest (ROIs). Model-based contrast coefficients were spatially averaged in each
ROI for each participant. The effect of subjective value was significant in VMPFC (signedrank p=0.002) but non-significant, albeit with a positive trend, in striatum (p=0.079) and
PCC (p=0.062; Fig. 4b). Paired-samples comparisons identified a greater effect in VMPFC
than striatum (signed-rank p=0.012) and no significant differences between the other two
pairs of ROIs (ps>0.11).
In summary, results suggested that the region of VMPFC previously found to encode
subjective value during discrete choices and outcomes also reflected a dynamic reassessment
of subjective value during voluntary persistence. This was true to a greater degree for
VMPFC than striatum.

Author Manuscript

We additionally conducted a less-constrained analysis that could detect BOLD timecourse
differences predicted either by our model or alternative frameworks. Trial-onset-locked
timecourses were analyzed at the group level in a whole-brain voxelwise repeated-measures
ANOVA (n=19), with factors for condition (HP vs. LP) and timepoint. We focused on the
condition-by-timepoint interaction, seeking to identify signals that exhibited different
patterns of change over time in the two environments. This analysis avoids a priori
assumptions about either the form of the difference or the location of effects in the brain. A
significant interaction was observed in left and right VMPFC, left posterior parietal cortex,
and a small region of left superior temporal gyrus (Table 1b and Fig. 5a). Timecourse plots
(Fig. 5b – e) suggested that in VMPFC and parietal regions the effect took the form of a
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greater signal increase with elapsed time in the HP environment, consistent with theoretical
subjective value.

Author Manuscript

Further analyses tested for evidence of reward prediction error (RPE) signals30. When a
reward occurs, RPE is the difference between the obtained and expected outcome. Because
reward expectancy theoretically rose over time in the HP environment (Fig. 2c; see also RT
data above and heart rate data below), rewards at short delays should have been more
surprising and evoked larger RPEs than rewards at longer delays. We tested whether the
amplitude of the phasic BOLD response to reward was modulated by the delay duration that
preceded it. A negative effect would reflect an RPE-like pattern (smaller reward responses
after longer delays, a pattern seen previously in the firing rates of dopaminergic midbrain
neurons31). To focus on phasic reward responses while controlling for nonspecific effects of
elapsed time, we compared the modulatory effect in the post-reward epoch against the same
effect in a pre-reward epoch.
We observed no significant negative modulatory effect of elapsed time on the reward-related
BOLD response in any location. We did, however, identify an occipitoparietal cluster with
an effect in the opposite direction: a higher-amplitude BOLD response to rewards at longer
delays, which theoretically were more strongly anticipated (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Expectancy-driven amplification of brain responses has been seen before32, including in
visual cortex33; these effects bear a family resemblance to the facilitatory effects of spatial
attention34.

Author Manuscript

Numerous brain areas responded differentially to reward and quit keypresses, including
some that exhibited a ramp-up in activity prior to quit responses. We used a GLM to
estimate subject-wise perievent timecourses for the two event types separately (using all
keypresses across all four runs), and submitted the difference between reward-related and
quit-related timecourses to a group-level ANOVA. Significant effects occurred diffusely
across DMFC, lateral PFC, anterior insula, precentral sulcus, and occipital and posterior
parietal cortex (Fig. 6a – f). In DMFC, anterior insula, posterior parietal cortex, and anterior
PFC the difference consisted of an earlier elevated response for quit responses than reward
responses. Other regions, including occipital cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
responded more strongly to rewards. Broadly, these effects reflect that rewards involved a
visual cue whereas quitting was freely timed and volitional.

Author Manuscript

To test directly for signal changes that preceded decisions to quit, we performed a grouplevel ANOVA on only the first 5 points in the quit-related timecourse (−12.5 to −2.5s). A
significant effect of timepoint within this anticipatory interval was observed in posterior
parietal cortex, DMFC, anterior insula, and anterior PFC (Fig. 6a – f and Table 1c). VMPFC
showed no effects in either of the above analyses; that is, there was no evidence that
subjective value effects in VMPFC could be alternatively explained in terms of a role in
response preparation.
Somatic arousal
To test whether subjective value effects in BOLD activity were accompanied by changes in
general physiological arousal, we performed exploratory analyses of heart rate (inter-beat
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interval measured via pulse oximetry; n=17) as a function of task events. Heart rate
transiently accelerated after keypresses, but did not differ between the two conditions as a
function of delay time (Fig. 7a). In the HP condition there was greater transient cardiac
acceleration for rewards preceded by longer delays (Fig. 7b), bolstering our conclusion—
also supported by RTs and occipitoparietal BOLD effects—that subjective reward
expectancy increased with elapsed time in the HP condition. Comparing heart-rate
timecourses for reward and quit events revealed cardiac deceleration, a well-known correlate
of motor preparation35, prior to quit responses (Fig. 7c). In summary, pre- and post-keypress
brain responses (Fig. 6a – f) co-occurred with changes in general somatic arousal, but there
was no evidence that arousal effects (as indexed by heart rate) accompanied the trial-onsetlocked BOLD effects of theoretical subjective value (Figs. 4 and 5).

Discussion
Author Manuscript

Decision makers faced with uncertain delay should reappraise awaited rewards as time
passes. Depending on the statistics of the environment, the passage of time may either
decrease or increase one’s estimate of how long a delay remains. This type of dynamic
reassessment offers a rationale for sustaining or curtailing persistence.

Author Manuscript

We elicited either greater or lesser willingness to persist in laboratory environments by
manipulating the timing statistics that governed reward delivery. Decision makers calibrated
their level of persistence adaptively; this extends previous demonstrations of environmentspecific calibration of intertemporal choice behavior13, 36. Convergent RT, BOLD and heartrate data suggested participants encoded the relevant timing statistics, responding more
vigorously to more strongly expected rewards28. Behavior still fell short of optimality, and
an important goal for future work is to determine whether this was due to inexact statistical
learning, strong prior expectations, stochastic noise, unmodeled sources of value (e.g.,
anticipation37) or other causes. Future work should also test whether performance would
differ if immediate or viscerally tempting rewards were at stake (e.g., appetizing foods
instead of money)1.
The success of the behavioral manipulation enabled us to examine time-dependent brain
signals associated with either high or limited behavioral persistence. We observed signals in
VMPFC consistent with a dynamic and context-sensitive reassessment of the awaited
outcome’s subjective value. This effect was identified using both model-guided and
exploratory fMRI timecourse analyses, both at the whole-brain level and in ROIs previously
implicated in subjective evaluation.

Author Manuscript

VMPFC and persistence
Persistence toward future rewards has been classically understood to depend on selfregulatory psychological processes that compete with and override more impulsive, rewardsensitive processes1, 2, 11. Dual-system psychological models have given rise to the
neuroscientific hypothesis that competitive dynamics exist between brain regions subserving
cognitive control and reward processing21–23.
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In contrast to this standard view, we have proposed that delay-of-gratification decisions
depend on a dynamic reappraisal of the awaited future reward12, 13. This account attributes
differences in waiting behavior across individuals and situations to factors such as temporal
beliefs, perceived outcome values and the perceived cost of time, not merely to differences
in the capacity to exert self-control12. Here we elicited differences in waiting by
manipulating temporal beliefs and obtained evidence for a time-varying representation of
subjective value. The hypothesized signal is context dependent, evolving over time in a
manner that depends on the timing statistics of the current environment. A corresponding
BOLD trajectory was identified in VMPFC, a cortical region regarded as part of a final
common pathway in the prospective evaluation of choice alternatives6. These results are
consistent with the view that persistence depends on the same neural and cognitive processes
that guide other forms of reward evaluation and economic choice. This view implies that
adaptive persistence depends on accurately representing the value of waiting, and need not
depend on the engagement of effortful inhibitory control processes38. Our results add to the
large body of evidence that VMPFC valuation processes utilize a detailed representation of
higher-order task structure18, 19. Our findings also extend current conceptions of VMPFC
function; while VMPFC activity is known to encode phasic subjective value during discrete
choices3–8, we found that it also tracked subjective value in a temporally extended manner
(see Jimura et al.39 for a related finding).

Author Manuscript

Our neuroimaging results suggest there is no need to posit antagonistic dynamics between
neural reward systems and control systems to explain voluntary persistence (though we
cannot, of course, rule out such dynamics in other situations). Our analyses could have
detected patterns suggestive of dual-system competition. For example, the analyses in Figs.
4 and 5 and Supplementary Fig. 4 could have detected activity scaling with the difficulty of
persistence, but no such effects were found. The analyses in Fig. 6 could have detected a
lapse in control-related activity before decisions to quit, but instead the opposite occurred:
an ensemble of regions previously implicated in cognitive control—lateral PFC, DMFC,
insula, and parietal cortex—increased activity prior to quits, consistent with brain responses
found to precede shifts of strategy in other task paradigms26, 40.

Author Manuscript

Our findings are more compatible with the hypothesis that cognitive control operates via
value modulation9, 17, 20. The value modulation hypothesis stipulates that control
mechanisms in lateral PFC operate by modulating subjective value representations in
VMPFC. The hypothesis therefore posits a VMPFC signal that incorporates all relevant
information and suffices as a final common pathway to guide decisions, consistent with the
present findings. It additionally posits that this signal depends on lateral PFC inputs. On this
point our data are mostly silent. We found no evidence for condition-dependent activation
trajectories in lateral PFC; nevertheless we assume value computation involves interactions
among multiple brain regions, and we cannot exclude the possibility that lateral PFC plays a
role.
Value representation during foraging
The problem of calibrating persistence in our willingness-to-wait task is closely analogous
to the patch departure problem in foraging24–26. It has recently been hypothesized that
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foraging, which typically involves a succession of accept/reject decisions, imposes
fundamentally different information-processing demands from standard multi-alternative
economic choice41. Recent work has implicated dACC in signaling the value of exiting
foraging patches26 or of shifting away from default alternatives41, although other findings
have questioned this idea42.

Author Manuscript

We did not find evidence for continuous, prospective encoding of the value of quitting
(analogous to patch departure) in dACC. Such a signal would theoretically have followed an
inverted version of the value of waiting (Fig. 3c,d), and could have been detected in either
our model-based analysis (as a negative effect) or our exploratory timecourse analyses. We
did, however, observe a response in dACC and other frontal and parietal regions in
anticipation of quit decisions. This pattern is consistent with general motor preparation as
well as with the possibility that decision-related signals in dACC manifest predominantly
during overt choice execution26, 43.
The present results point to a role for VMPFC valuation signals even in a foraging-like
situation where decision makers encountered one opportunity at a time and sought to
maximize their overall rate of return. VMPFC activity correlated with the value of the
current opportunity (waiting for the current token). This finding agrees with the idea that
VMPFC encodes a “best minus next-best” comparative value signal41 even when the “nextbest” is the constant background option of moving on to a new opportunity. This parallels
previous demonstrations that VMPFC reflects the subjective value of individual options that
are evaluated in turn against a fixed reference alternative7. Our findings suggest continuity
between the valuation mechanisms involved in temporally extended foraging scenarios and
multi-option economic choice.

Author Manuscript

Reward prediction error

Author Manuscript

The willingness-to-wait task theoretically involves both positive and negative RPE. Positive
RPE should accompany reward delivery since, given temporal uncertainty, rewards are not
fully predicted at the specific time they are delivered31. Conversely, the pre-reward interval
(when the reward could have occurred but does not) presumably involves negative
RPE44, 45. Long delays in the HP environment highlight the dissociability of value and RPE
signals. Reward expectancy ramps up over time (Fig. 2c), so nonreward should be
associated with progressively larger negative RPE even as the awaited reward’s subjective
value steadily increases (Fig. 3a). Even though decision makers may be increasingly
surprised that the reward did not come now, they are also increasingly confident that it will
arrive soon. One potential explanation for the lack of clear RPE signals in our neuroimaging
data might be that, at least at the resolution of fMRI, RPE and subjective value signals were
superimposed.
Subjective value is canonically associated with BOLD activity in VMPFC, PCC, and
striatum3–5, and a broad standing question is how these regions might differ in their
computational contributions to decision behavior. One possibility is that striatum
preferentially encodes RPE46, 47 whereas VMPFC preferentially encodes prospective
decision values6, 47. The present findings appear compatible with such a distinction: a
dynamic signal of prospective subjective value was observed in VMPFC, but was
Nat Neurosci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 November 01.
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significantly less evident in striatum. However, these results will need to be integrated with
insights gained using other neuroscientific techniques; recent evidence from direct dopamine
recordings suggests striatum may indeed exhibit a ramping pre-reward signal48, and other
work points to an important role for serotonergic neuromodulation in behavioral
persistence49. It will also be important for future research to assess the fidelity with which
VMPFC encodes the individual components of subjective value (Supplementary Fig. 2), to
isolate valuation from related factors such as moment-by-moment reward probability33, 50,
and to test the generality of these effects across different magnitudes and types of rewards.
Research on these topics will yield an enriched picture of how the brain's valuation
mechanisms contend with the complexity of real-world decision environments.

Methods
Author Manuscript

Participants
The participants were 20 members of the University of Pennsylvania community (age 18–
30, mean=22, 11 female). Two additional participants were excluded for head movement
(shifts of at least 0.5mm between >5% of adjacent timepoints). Participants were paid a
show-up fee ($15/hr) plus rewards earned in the task (median=$19.80). All participants
provided informed consent. The procedures were approved by the University of
Pennsylvania Internal Review Board. No statistical methods were used to predetermine
sample size but our sample size was similar to those reported in previous
publications16, 18, 19, 32, 42, 47.
Task

Author Manuscript

The task was programmed using Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) with Psychophysics
Toolbox extensions51, 52. A circular token, colored green or purple, appeared in the center of
the screen, labeled “0¢.” After a random delay the token turned blue and its value changed
to 30¢. Participants could sell the token anytime by pressing a key with their right hand. The
word “SOLD” appeared in red over the token for 1 s. After a 1 s blank screen, a new token
appeared. The previous token’s value was added to the participant’s total earnings, which
were displayed only at the end of each scanning run. Setting the token’s initial value to 0¢
meant that, unlike earlier work using this paradigm13, participants received no immediate
reward upon quitting. This served to simplify the task without significantly altering either its
incentive structure or the resulting pattern of behavior.

Author Manuscript

A white progress bar marked the amount of time the current token had been on the screen.
The bar’s full length corresponded to 100 s. It grew continuously from the left and reset
when a new token appeared. The progress bar was included to reduce interval-timing
demands and discourage a strategy of covertly counting time.
The scanning session was divided into four 10-min runs. New tokens were presented until
time was up. Each run presented one timing environment (i.e., token color). The two
environments alternated in successive runs. The order of environments and the mapping of
token color to environment were counterbalanced across participants.
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Each participant completed a preliminary behavioral training session consisting of 4 10-min
runs alternating between the HP and LP environments. Participants were explicitly
instructed that the green and purple tokens might differ in their timing, but that they had to
learn the nature of the differences from direct experience and were free to adopt any
behavioral strategy they preferred. During behavioral training (but not during scanning) the
screen displayed the time left in the 10-min run and the amount earned so far, to help ensure
that participants understood the structure of the task. Each token during behavioral training
was worth 10¢. Participants explored the task environments during training, waiting through
full 90s delays in the LP condition on a median of 3.5 trials (IQR 1 to 5.5; >0 for 18/20
subjects). Participants completed two additional 5-min runs (one per condition) outside the
scanner just before the fMRI session. Waiting behavior over time across training, practice,
and fMRI sessions is plotted in Supplementary Fig. 1.

Author Manuscript

Participants would have faced fundamentally the same trial-by-trial decision problem if they
had received explicit information about the probabilistic contingencies in lieu of experiencebased training (cf. Luhmann et al.53). However, there is evidence that probabilistic
information is encoded differently when learned from description vs. direct experience54–56;
our training procedure was designed to involve the type of experience-based, implicit
statistical learning that is thought to guide beliefs and expectations in real-world domains29,
including ecological foraging environments. Future work might introduce explicit
information to help assess whether deviations from optimal behavior were due to inexact
encoding of the relevant probabilities.

Author Manuscript

The delay duration on each trial was randomly drawn from a discrete probability distribution
(Fig 1b). In the HP environment delays were drawn uniformly from the values 5, 10, 15, 20,
25, 30, 35, and 40s. In the LP environment delays were set to 90s with probability 0.5, and
otherwise drawn uniformly from the values 5, 10, 15, and 20s. By design, reward
probabilities were identical between the two environments for the first 20s of the delay, the
period of greatest interest in our neuroimaging analyses. We imposed longer delays here
than in our previous work13 in order to obtain fluctuations in subjective value across a time
period on the order of 30s, which is well suited for detecting BOLD effects (this corresponds
to the time scale of a blocked design with ~15 s blocks; see further discussion and
simulation results below).
Delays were sampled in a pseudorandom manner that approximately balanced the first-order
transition statistics between delays in successive trials. This helped ensure that the scheduled
delays were representative of the ground-truth distribution, while avoiding the negative
autocorrelation that would result from strictly balanced frequencies.

Author Manuscript

The HP environment was richer by design, with all participants receiving more rewards in
the HP environment (median=44, IQR 41 to 46.5) than in the LP environment (median=25,
IQR 21 to 26). The difference in overall richness was not the factor that determined the ideal
behavioral strategy (one could design richer LP environments and poorer HP
environments13), but emerged here as a side-effect of our decision to match the sizes of
individual rewards and the reward probabilities over the first 20s. These design choices
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maximized the comparability of the two conditions for purposes of our neuroimaging
contrasts.
We quantified behavioral persistence using Kaplan-Meier survival curves57, which
estimated the probability of “surviving” various lengths of time without quitting. This
technique accommodated the fact that reward delivery censored observed waiting times13.
Modeling ideal performance
The rate-maximizing strategy was to wait through all delays in the HP environment (up to
40 s), but to give up after 20 s in the LP environment. We determined this by calculating the
expected rate of return for various giving-up times (Fig. 1c). This calculation follows
previous work13, and has precedent in stochastic foraging models25.

Author Manuscript

The reward’s arrival time treward is a random variable. For a policy of quitting at time T, let
pT equal the probability of receiving the reward, pT = Pr(treward ≤ T), and let τT equal the
expected delay if the reward is received, τT = E(treward | treward ≤ T). Each trial’s expected
rate of return, in ¢/s, is:
(1)

Author Manuscript

The numerator is a trial’s expected gain in cents and the denominator is a trial’s expected
cost in seconds, assuming a 30¢ reward and a 2 s inter-trial interval. The goal is to find the
value of T that maximizes RT. We use R* to denote the best available rate of return. Fig. 1c
plots RT as a function of T. The best policy in the HP environment was to wait 40s (R* =
1.22¢/s), whereas the best policy in the LP environment was to wait 20s (R* = 0.82¢/s).
Modeling subjective value as a function of elapsed time
At each point in a trial, the token's subjective value depended on three factors: (1) the
expected earnings from that token, (2) the expected additional time to be spent on that token,
and (3) the monetary value of time, which corresponds to R* from above. We denote the
expected earnings as aT(t) and the expected time as bT(t). Each of these depends jointly on
the current elapsed time t and the intended future quitting time T. For given values of t and
T, the expected return is:
(2)

Author Manuscript

The current trial’s subjective value (denoted “potential” in the model’s original
formulation25) equals the maximum value of gT across all possible quitting times:
(3)

Put differently, g(t) is the expected net return in the remainder of the current trial,
accounting for the cost of time, under the best available waiting policy. Its minimum is zero
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because there is always an option to quit immediately (we treat the ITI as part of the
subsequent trial). The decision maker should continue waiting if g(t) > 0.
Fig. 3a shows g(t) as a function of t in each environment (see Supplementary Fig. 2 for
decomposition of g(t) into its components). The function approaches 30¢ at the last possible
reward time, when a 30¢ reward is expected with no further delay. The best strategy is to
wait up to 40 s in the HP environment but quit at 20 s in the LP environment. If a decision
maker in the LP environment were to have waited 53.5 s already it would be better at that
point to continue waiting for the reward that was sure to arrive at 90 s. We obtained very
similar results if we used each participant’s actual environment-specific reward rate in place
of the theoretical maximum, R* (Supplementary Fig. 6).

Author Manuscript

Behavior could be well characterized as a stochastic function of theoretical subjective value.
To evaluate this we represented each subject’s behavior as a series of pseudo-choices
between waiting and quitting, placed every 1s throughout all delay intervals in the
experiment. We then modeled pseudo-choice outcomes (1=wait, 0=quit) as a function of
subjective value and a constant intercept in subject-wise logistic regressions. Subject-wise
maximum-likelihood coefficients were tested at the group level using a Wilcoxon signedrank test. We additionally used likelihood-ratio tests at the single-subject level to compare
the full model to the (nested) intercept-only model, and tested the resulting z statistics at the
group level. Finally, we tested an alternative model that, in place of subjective value, coded
the HP and LP conditions categorically. This model had the same number of parameters as
the subjective value model and could represent the possibility that participants merely quit
more often in the LP than HP environment. Subject-wise differences in model deviance
were tested against zero using a group-level Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.

Author Manuscript

Allowing for endogenous temporal uncertainty did not substantially alter the theoretical
results described above. Fig. 2c displays hypothetical continuous hazard functions allowing
for subjective uncertainty in time-interval perception58. For an interval of true duration t,
subjective uncertainty is typically well characterized by a Gaussian distribution with mean µ
= t and standard deviation σ = t × CV, where CV is a fixed coefficient of variation. We
modeled temporal uncertainty by converting each discrete distribution in Fig. 1b to a
Gaussian mixture distribution. A Gaussian component was placed at each possible reward
time t, with µ = t, σ = t × CV, and weight equal to Pr(treward=t). We set CV=0.16 on the
basis of human behavioral findings (the median CV from Table 2 of Rakitin et al.59 after
converting the unit of variability from full-width-at-half-maximum to SD). The continuous
functions in Fig. 2c are scaled by a factor of 5 for comparability with the corresponding
discrete functions.

Author Manuscript

Blurring the ground-truth timing distributions to allow for subjective uncertainty did not
change any of our model-based theoretical predictions. If rates of return (Fig. 1c) were
calculated using the Gaussian mixture distribution, the best policy was to wait 40 s in the HP
environment and 22.1 s in the LP environment. Endogenous uncertainty smoothed the
theoretical subjective value functions (Fig. 3a) without altering their general shape.
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MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens Trio with a 32-channel head coil. Functional data
were acquired using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence (3mm isotropic
voxels, 64×64 matrix, 44 axial slices tilted 30° from the AC-PC plane, TR=2500 ms, TE=25
ms, flip angle=75°). There were 4 runs, each with 246 images (10 min, 15 s). At the end of
the session we acquired matched fieldmap images (TR=1000 ms, TE=2.69 and 5.27 ms, flip
angle=60°) and a T1-weighted MPRAGE structural image (0.9375×0.9375×1 mm voxels,
192×256 matrix, 160 axial slices, TI=1100 ms, TR=1630 ms, TE=3.11 ms, flip angle=15°).

Author Manuscript

Data were preprocessed using FSL60–63 and AFNI64, 65 software. Functional data were
temporally aligned to midpoint of each acquisition (AFNI's 3dTshift), motion corrected
(FSL's MCFLIRT), undistorted and warped to MNI space (see below), outlier-attenuated
(AFNI's 3dDespike), smoothed with a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel (FSL's fslmaths), and
intensity-scaled by a single grand-mean value per run. To warp the data to MNI space,
functional data were aligned to the structural image (FSL's FLIRT) using boundary-based
registration66, simultaneously incorporating fieldmap-based geometric undistortion.
Separately, the structural image was nonlinearly coregistered to the MNI template (FSL's
FLIRT and FNIRT). The two transformations were concatenated and applied to the
functional data.
fMRI analysis
Voxelwise general linear models (GLMs) were fit using ordinary least squares (AFNI's
3dDeconvolve). GLMs were estimated for each subject individually using data concatenated
across the 4 runs. There were 12 baseline terms per run: a constant, 5 low-frequency drift
terms (first-through-fifth-order Legendre polynomials), and 6 motion parameters.

Author Manuscript

Event-related BOLD signal timecourses were flexibly estimated by fitting piecewise linear
splines (“tent” basis functions). For trial-onset-locked timecourses, basis functions were
centered every 2.5 s beginning at 2.5 s and ending 1 s before the end of each trial (for
example, the basis function regressor corresponding to “10 s” had a peak 10 s after trial
onset for every trial that lasted at least 11 s). For reward-related and quit-related
timecourses, basis functions were centered every 2.5 s from 12.5 s before to 12.5 s after the
event.

Author Manuscript

We conducted simulations to confirm the validity of our analysis procedures. We calculated
theoretical subjective value over the course of each subject’s entire experimental session
using the actual timing of task events together with the ideal model in Fig. 3a. These fullsession timecourses were convolved with a hemodynamic response function (HRF) to
generate subject-specific synthetic BOLD timecourses representing idealized theoretical
predictions. In order to verify that the theoretical signal had a suitable time scale and could
be distinguished from baseline drift, we fit these synthetic BOLD timecourses in a GLM that
contained only the constant and drift terms. For each subject, the residuals were highly
correlated with a merely de-meaned version of the original synthetic BOLD timecourses
(median r2=0.90, IQR 0.88 to 0.93), indicating that the theoretical signal could indeed be
clearly distinguished from baseline fluctuations. Next we used the synthetic BOLD
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timecourses as inputs to the analysis procedure described above for estimating trial-onsetlocked timecourses. The resulting timecourses, shown in averaged form in Fig. 3d,
constituted our subject-by-subject theoretical predictions.

Author Manuscript

The model-based analysis was performed voxelwise on all 20 subjects across 2.5–30 s from
trial onset. Each subject’s empirically estimated difference timecourse (HP minus LP) was
regressed on the theoretical difference timecourse (Fig. 3d) together with a constant
intercept. Using the simplified HRF-convolved theoretical timecourses in Fig. 3c yielded
equivalent results. Timepoints lacking data in either environment for a given subject were
omitted (this resulted in the omission of 3 timepoints for one subject; see Supplementary
Fig. 3). We adopted a two-step approach (first estimating the timecourses and then
submitting them to the model-based contrast) so that included timepoints were weighted
uniformly. Otherwise, early timepoints, which were sampled more frequently
(Supplementary Fig. 3), would have received greater weight, and the pattern of timepoint
weighting could have differed between environments for individual subjects. Contrast
coefficients were tested against zero at the group level in 2-tailed voxelwise t-tests.

Author Manuscript

An additional open-ended analysis tested for condition-by-timepoint interactions in the trialonset-locked BOLD timecourses (using n=19 participants with complete data;
Supplementary Fig. 3). The main effect of timepoint is of limited interest because it captures
nonspecific effects of time-from-keypress; similarly, the main effect of condition is
uninformative because the two conditions were presented in separate runs with independent
baselines. The condition-by-timepoint interaction tests for a difference in BOLD trajectories
between the two environments without constraining the form of the difference. In a
repeated-measures framework this is equivalent to testing the main effect of timepoint on the
difference in signal between the two environments. Accordingly, we performed a voxelwise
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on the difference timecourses (HP minus LP) at the
group level. An equivalent procedure was used to compare BOLD timecourses aligned to
reward-related and quit-related keypresses.

Author Manuscript

The RPE analysis was limited to the HP environment, in which the sustained rise in reward
expectancy supported clear predictions. Within a GLM we estimated FIR coefficients for the
peri-reward timecourse (from 7.5 s before to 10 s after each reward). Eight terms modeled
the mean timecourse, and another 8 terms modeled amplitude modulation at each timepoint
as a function of the preceding delay duration. We then computed a contrast of the
modulatory effect for 3 post-reward timepoints (2.5 to 7.5 s) minus 3 earlier timepoints (–5
to 0 s). The value of this contrast reflected modulation of the phasic reward response as a
function of preceding delay time, over and above any nonspecific effect of elapsed time on
the pre-reward baseline.
All whole-brain, group-level analyses assessed statistical significance on the basis of cluster
mass, with the cluster-defining threshold set to the nominal p<0.01 level. Corrected p-values
were determined using permutation testing67 (FSL's randomise; 5000 iterations), and results
were thresholded at corrected p<0.05. For F tests, each random iteration shuffled timepoints
within subject. For one-sample t-tests, each iteration randomly sign-flipped individual
subjects’ coefficient maps.
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Heart rate data acquisition and analysis
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Pulse oximetry data were recorded at 50 Hz using the MRI system’s built-in oximeter,
which also performed automatic heartbeat detection. Timestamped data were successfully
recorded for 17 of the 20 participants. Heartbeat times were converted to inter-beat interval
(IBI). IBI values farther than 30% above or below the grand median were treated as missing
(median = 1.6% of points removed; IQR 0.5 to 3.6%). Since IBI varied across individuals
(median=820 ms; IQR 760 to 950 ms), IBI values were converted to a percentage of the
individual’s grand median. Mean perievent timecourses were calculated on a 0.25 s grid for
each subject and event type. For comparisons, timecourses for two event types were
subtracted to yield single-subject difference timecourses, which were then tested at the
group level for significant excursions from zero. Entire timecourses were tested using
cluster-based control for multiple comparisons. Cluster size was defined as the number of
adjacent timepoints with nominal p<0.05 in single-timepoint Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. A
cluster was assigned a corrected p-value based on its percentile in the empirical null
distribution for cluster size, which was obtained via permutation testing (10,000 iterations
with randomized sign-flipping of individual subjects’ difference timecourses).
A supplementary methods checklist is available.

Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1.

Experimental task and timing conditions. A: Schematic of the willingness-to-wait task. B:
Discrete probability distributions governing the scheduled delay times in each environment.
C: Expected monetary rates of return under various waiting policies, where each policy is
defined by a giving-up time. The reward-maximizing policy was to wait up to 40s in the HP
environment (i.e., never to quit), but only up to 20s in the LP environment. These rates of
return are contingent on the fixed 2s inter-trial interval (ITI).
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Figure 2.
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Behavioral results. A: Survival curves reflecting the probability that a participant was still
waiting at each elapsed time, provided that the reward had not yet been delivered. Empirical
survival curves were averaged across subjects at 1 s intervals (+/− SEM). Ideal performance
is plotted for reference (dashed lines). B: Area under the curve (AUC) values calculated
from individual participants’ survival curves. The maximum possible value was 40s. Red
point marks ideal performance. All 20 participants persisted more in the HP environment. C:
Stem plots show the ground-truth hazard rate for reward in each environment: i.e., the
probability of the reward arriving at each time, conditional on not having arrived already.
Faded lines illustrate hypothetical continuous hazard functions incorporating endogenous
temporal uncertainty (see Methods). D: Reward RT at each delay (median and IQR of
subject-wise medians). RTs are expressed as deviations from each subject’s grand-median
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RT (median=475ms, IQR 450 to 506ms) to display within-subject effects. RTs for 5–20s
delays did not differ between the environments (HP median=472ms, IQR 454 to 538; LP
median=494ms, IQR 443 to 522).
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Figure 3.
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Theoretical subjective value of the awaited token as a function of elapsed time in each
environment. A: A token's subjective value increased over time in the HP environment but
not in the LP environment. These timecourses are based on the discrete ground-truth timing
distributions and would be smoothed by subjective temporal uncertainty. B: Simulated
behavior from a model in which subjective value linearly influenced the log-odds of
continuing to wait (mean +/− SEM of subject-wise model fits). Data from Fig. 2a are
overlaid for reference. C: Subjective value timecourses convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function (HRF). D: Predicted BOLD timecourses obtained by
applying our fMRI analysis to idealized synthetic data (mean +/− SEM of individual subject
results). Visual differences from Panel C reflect that (1) the HP and LP environments had
independent baselines, and (2) there was a small degree of carryover across trials. In spite of
these differences the theoretical difference timecourses (HP minus LP) were highly
correlated between Panels C and D (median r2=0.88, IQR 0.84 to 0.89).
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Figure 4.

Model-based contrast results. A: Whole-brain analysis. Displayed in red is the VMPFC
cluster that showed a significant relationship with the theoretical subjective value
timecourses in Fig. 3d. In yellow, for reference, are regions identified in a previous metaanalysis of valuation effects (the regions reported in Fig. 3D of Bartra et al.3). Overlap was
observed in VMPFC, though not in PCC or striatum. B: Model-based contrast values for
each participant, spatially averaged within meta-analytic ROIs. Subjective value effects
were significantly positive in VMPFC, and significantly greater in VMPFC than striatum.
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Figure 5.

Model-free analysis of trial-onset-locked BOLD timecourses. A: Clusters showing a
significant timepoint-by-environment interaction (Table 1b). B–E: Spatially averaged signal
timecourses for significant clusters (mean +/− SEM), illustrating the form of the observed
interactions. Although voxel selection effects would distort follow-up inferential tests of
these timecourses, we descriptively summarized their resemblance to our theoretical
predictions in terms of the correlation between the average theoretical (Fig. 3d) and
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observed HP-minus-LP difference timecourses. The resulting Pearson r values were 0.91,
0.89, 0.90, and −0.68 for the results in Panels B–E, respectively.
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Figure 6.

Regions in which BOLD signal differentiated reward-related and quit-related keypresses,
assessed on the basis of the event type (reward vs. quit) by timepoint interaction. Warm
colors represent F statistics for the analysis of full timecourses, and crosshairs mark local
peaks. Blue outlines mark regions significant in the analysis of pre-quit timepoints only.
Timecourses (mean +/− SEM) are plotted for a 6mm-radius (33-voxel) sphere centered at
each depicted focus point. Black dashed lines mark the keypress time; blue dashed lines
mark the median reward cue time (for reward-related keypresses).
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Figure 7.
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Effects of task events on mean cardiac inter-beat interval (IBI; lower values correspond to
faster heart rate). Error bands show SEM; red bands mark significant differences. A: Mean
trial-onset-locked IBI timecourse in each condition. Vertical red dashed line marks trial
onset; gray dashed line marks the preceding keypress. Each trial contributed data until 1 s
before the trial ended (later timepoints therefore have fewer observations than earlier
timepoints). No significant differences were observed. B: Comparison between rewards
arriving at shorter (5–20s) vs. longer (25–40s) delays in the HP condition. The amplitude of
post-keypress heart-rate acceleration was greater for rewards that followed longer delays
(lag +1s to +2.75s; permutation-based p=0.018). C: Comparison between reward events in
the HP condition and quit events in the LP condition, each restricted to trials with duration
>10s. Vertical red dashed line marks the time of the reward cue or quit keypress. Results
suggested transient cardiac deceleration prior to quit responses (lag −1s to −3s; permutationbased p=0.045).
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